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  • Bergmann, Julian ; Hackenesch, Christine ; Stockemer, Daniel. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe: What Impact Do they Have on Development Policy? // Journal of Common Market Studies (2021) nr 1, lk 37 - 52.
    Previous research suggests that the rise of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) is contributing to the politicization of European domestic and external policies. However, whether this is also the case for European development policy is unclear. Building on a new dataset that analyses government positions and coalition agreements across European countries since the 1990s, we investigate whether, and if so how, the strength of PRRPs affects European governments' framing of the relationship between migration and development policy. Research on PRRPs suggests that they influence other parties' positions directly when they are in government, or indirectly by framing topics such as migration differently from other parties, thereby pushing government and opposition parties to modify their own positions. We find (moderate) support for PRRPs' indirect influence on the framing and salience of the migration–development policy nexus, via their vote and seat share. The effect of PRRPs in government on the formulation of development aid policy goals is smaller. (Wiley Online Library)
  • Bijsmans, Patrick. The Eurozone crisis and Euroscepticism in the European press // Journal of European Integration (2021) nr. 3, lk. 331-346.
    The representation of EU debates in the mass media has received comparatively little attention in studies on Euroscepticism, despite criticism on the EU having become mainstream since the early 1990s in particular. Recently, a number of salient crises have brought European politics to the fore like never before. This article presents an analysis of different types of criticism on and opposition towards the EU as present in media at the height of the Eurozone crisis in 2012. Using a four-fold typology, it looks at views about the EU and its policies as present in coverage by quality newspapers in Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands. An analysis of 1,085 claims from 454 articles shows that, rather than rejecting integration or EU involvement in certain policies, criticism was predominantly aimed at existing policies and on presenting different policy options. (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • Down, Ian ; Joon Han, Kyung. Far right parties and ‘Europe’: societal polarization and the limits of EU issue contestation // Journal of European Integration (2021) nr. 1, lk. 65-81.
    Europe has experienced both marked growth in public support for far right parties and growth in public Euro-skepticism. While far right parties have become associated with particularly strident negative orientations towards the European Union (EU), there is considerable variation in the extent of their antipathy, and, in the extent to which they emphasize the EU. Here we examine the conditions under which far right parties can successfully leverage the EU issue to win votes. Specifically, we argue that the extent of societal polarization on the EU constitutes an important intermediating condition. Our findings indicate that individuals are more likely to vote far right when these parties contest the EU, but only if they do so in a context of societal polarization on the issue. (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • Dyduch, Joanna ; Müller, Patrick. Populism meets EU Foreign policy: the de-Europeanization of Poland´s Foreign policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict // Journal of European Integration (2021) nr. 5, lk. 569-586.
    This article bridges between the de-Europeanization framework and works on populism to theorize about de-Europeanization dynamics and their potential drivers. Empirically, the article explores Polish foreign policy under the PiS government for the case of EU-foreign policy cooperation toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a highly Europeanized foreign policy issue and longstanding EU priority, the Israeli Palestinian conflict constitutes an interesting case for the emerging research agenda on foreign policy de-Europeanization. Whilst Poland’s traditional support for the EU’s common approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been part of its wider Europeanization experience, we argue that under PiS government Poland’s foreign policy has changed in important ways, showing signs of de-Europeanization. These changes have been driven by both, ideologically informed preferences of the Law and Justice led government as well as external expectations and pressures. (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • Henke, Marina ; Maher, Richard. The populist challenge to European defense // Journal of European Public Policy (2021) nr. 3, lk. 389-406.
    This article assesses the consequences and implications of the rise of European populist parties for European defense cooperation. Focusing on six of the most prominent populist parties in Europe today, we examine their positions along three important defense-related issues: recommended national force posture; integrated military forces; and main national security threats. To determine their position on these three issues, we examine every party manifesto and, if available, official party document on security and defense policy since 2010. We argue that the rise of populism in Europe does not represent an inflection point for the future of European defense cooperation. Instead, our analysis reveals the following three findings: European defense cooperation will continue to be essentially ad hoc, functionally driven, and issue specific; populist parties’ attitudes and preferences regarding European defense cooperation both overlap with and diverge from those of other populists and non-populists in the EU; and populism over time may contribute to a shift in domestic preferences toward a Europe that more readily embraces military power. (Taylor & Francis Journals Online)
  • Huber, Robert A. et al. Is populism a challenge to European energy and climate policy? Empirical evidence across varieties of populism // Journal of European Public Policy (2021)
    Despite the burgeoning literature, evidence on how right-wing populists frame and act on energy and climate issues is limited and even more scarce for other types of populist parties. We address this gap by exploring the policy discourses, positions and actions of six European populist parties from Austria, Czechia, Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain belonging to different types of populism. We argue that there is substantial and largely neglected variation among different populist parties in their approach to and effects on EU energy and climate policy (ECP). We find support for the notion that right-wing and right-leaning valence populist parties are at odds with ambitious EU ECP. On the contrary, the analysed left-wing and left-leaning valence populists rely on populist discourses to demand more ambitious ECP measures. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that participation in government decreases the role of populism in parties’ ECP discourse and dilutes parties’ positions and actions. (Taylor & Francis Online)
  • Neuwahl, Nanette ; Kovacs, Charles. Hungary and the EU’s rule of law protection // Journal of European Integration (2021) nr. 1, lk. 17-32. 
    The EU is in the process of adopting a new Rule of Law Regulation which passed Parliament in January 2019. How is this a useful addition to the existing political procedures under the Treaties? Also, in what way would a revised litigation strategy before the European Court of Justice (CJEU) add anything to the arsenal of remedies thus available? Using principally the example of Hungary, the authors argue that the newly proposed regulation is a valuable addition, but that a somewhat revised litigation strategy can also help defend EU values. (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • Treib, Oliver. Euroscepticism is here to stay: what cleavage theory can teach us about the 2019 European Parliament elections // Journal of European Public Policy (2021) nr. 2, lk. 174-189.
    In the 2019 European Parliament elections, Eurosceptic parties were able to consolidate their strong results from 2014. Based on a specified conceptualization of Euroscepticism, this article provides an overview of the Eurosceptic vote and argues that Eurosceptic parties have by now established themselves as a fixed part of the EU party system. It interprets Euroscepticism as the upshot of an emerging centre–periphery cleavage in EU politics. In analogy to the emergence of opposition to processes of administrative centralization and cultural homogenization during nation-building, this perspective sees Euroscepticism as a reaction to the process of centre-formation at the European level, as a way of defending the specific cultural, economic and regulatory traditions of member states against the process of centralization of authority at the European level since the 1950s. The article concludes by discussing the implications of this argument for both EU scholars and practitioners. (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • Weiss, Tomáš. De-Europeanisation of Czech policy towards Eastern Partnership countries under populist leaders // Journal of European Integration (2021) nr. 5, lk. 587-602.
    Europeanisation alters the conduct, content and norms of EU member states’ foreign policies. This has also been true for Czech policy towards Eastern Europe, where the country actively supported EU frameworks and promoted European norms. With the rise of populists, however, the adherence to EU norms and structures has decreased to the extent that makes de-Europeanisation possible. This article analyses Czech policy towards Eastern Partnership countries after 2013 when populists entered the government. Based on three elements of potential de-Europeanisation, the adherence to European framework, professional norms and role of EU expertise, and deviation from foundational norms, the article concludes that Czech foreign policy towards the region remains highly Europeanised. Czech populists have concentrated on domestic matters and showed little interest in and understanding of foreign policy. Any changes to foreign policy will occur as a by-product of domestic politics, not a result of deliberate change in course in the future. (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • Bisbee, James ; Mosley, Layna ; Pepinsky, Thomas B. ;  Rosendorff, Peter. Decompensating domestically: the political economy of anti-globalism // Journal of European Public Policy (2020)  nr. 7, lk. 1090-1102.
    The rise of populism across advanced industrial countries presents a challenge to the institutions and norms that make up the current global order and threatens to undo the global system that has enabled decades of free trade and investment. We outline in this paper a domestic political economy account of the contemporary crisis of the global order, rooted in disenchantment with the redistributive bargain between globalization’s winners and losers. We present individual and local-level evidence that is consistent with this account, first documenting the decline of the embedded liberal compromise over the past 40 years in Europe, and then providing individual-level evidence from the United States of growing protectionism and xenophobia in response to import exposure, particularly among respondents whose occupational profile is most risk-exposed. (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • Chryssogelos, Angelos. State transformation and populism: From the internationalized to the neo-sovereign state? // Politics (2020) nr 1.
    This article conceptualizes populism as a discourse of international relations that arises as response to state transformation, a phenomenon that encompasses changes in both state-society relations and the norms defining the appropriate practice of statehood. The current surge of populism is a response to one such transformation: the internationalization of state elites and their insulation from popular scrutiny. Populism does not simply address material and cultural dislocations that internationalization entails. Crucially, its distinct discursive logic allows these partial social demands to adopt the moral claim to representation of the ‘real people’ and so counter the universality of the international norms that underpin state transformation. Beyond the current conjuncture of state internationalization, this conceptualization accommodates iterations of populism in various regional and historical contexts of state transformation, making it a promising basis for the further comparative study of populism. (Sage Journals)
  • Franchino, Fabio ; Negri, Fedra. The fiscally moderate Italian populist voter: Evidence from a survey experiment // Party Politics (2020) nr , lk. 176-190. 
    Do economic policy preferences distinguish populist voters from mainstream ones? We compare the preference profile of the voters of the Five Star Movement (M5S), one of the most successful southern European populist parties, with the profile of voters of other parties at both the 2013 national and the 2014 European Parliament elections by means of a conjoint analysis experiment on economic policy programs. Despite economic insecurity and recent recessions being key drivers of populist voting, we provide evidence that M5S supporters are fiscally moderate: they are happy with the current size of government and oppose more spending. Their Euroscepticism, shared with right-wing voters and representing a new domestic divide, takes the form of a lukewarm support for the euro, which they would readily ditch if it were to improve economic performance. (Sage Journals)
  • Futák‐Campbell, Beatrix ;  Schwieter, Christian. Practising Populism: How Right‐wing Populists Negotiate Political Competence // Journal of Common Market Studies (2020) nr. 4, lk. 890-908.
    This article introduces a new way to consider right‐wing populism in Western Europe through practice theory. While historically, right‐wing populist parties have not been seen as one homogenous movement, their populist practices constitute a transnational challenge to the European political establishment. Building on practice theory, we contribute to the question of how these parties negotiate political competence through transnational practices on three levels: claiming competence by establishing a domain, community building and practising competence. These levels are explored through three sites of populist practices: Russia, the European Parliament and rallies by the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident (Pegida). Among these sites we consider the French Front National, the Dutch Partij van de Vrijheid, the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs and the German Alternative für Deutschland. We argue that in order to understand contemporary right‐wing populism better we ought to not only to consider what it is, but how it is practised. (Avatud juurdepääs)
  • Van Hauwaert, Steven M ; Schimpf, Christian H ; Azevedo, Flavio. The measurement of populist attitudes: Testing cross-national scales using item response theory // Politics (2020) nr 1.
    Recent research in the populism literature has devoted considerable efforts to the conceptualisation and examination of populism on the individual level, that is, populist attitudes. Despite rapid progress in the field, questions of adequate measurement and empirical evaluation of measures of populist attitudes remain scarce. Seeking to remedy these shortcomings, we apply a cross-national measurement model, using item response theory, to six established and two new populist indicators. Drawing on a cross-national survey (nine European countries, n = 18,368), we engage in a four-folded analysis. First, we examine the commonly used 6-item populism scale. Second, we expand the measurement with two novel items. Third, we use the improved 8-item populism scale to further refine equally comprehensive but more concise and parsimonious populist measurements. Finally, we externally validate these sub-scales and find that some of the proposed sub-scales outperform the initial 6- and 8-item scales. We conclude that existing measures of populism capture moderate populist attitudes, but face difficulties measuring more extreme levels, while the individual information of some of the populist items remains limited. Altogether, this provides several interesting routes for future research, both within and between countries. (Sage Journals)
  • Meijers, Maurits J. ;  Zaslove, Andrej. Measuring Populism in Political Parties: Appraisal of a New Approach // Comparative Political Studies (2020).
    Populism has become a pervasive concept in political science research. However, a central and basic question remains unanswered: which European parties are more populist than others? Despite the increasing wealth of studies on populism in parties, we lack data that measures populism in political parties in a valid and precise manner, that recognizes that populism is constituted by multiple dimensions, and that ensures full coverage of all parties in Europe. In this article, we first appraise the weaknesses of existing approaches. Arguing that parties’ populism should be measured as a latent construct, we then advocate a new approach to operationalizing and measuring populism in political parties using expert surveys. Relying on the Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey spanning 250 political parties in 28 European countries, we show that populism is best measured in a multi-dimensional and continuous manner. We subsequently illustrate the advantages of our approach for empirical analysis in political science. (Sage Journals)
  • Winzen, Thomas. Government Euroscepticism and differentiated integration // Journal of European Public Policy (2020) nr. 2, lk. 1819-1837.
    It is common to consider mass politics and Eurosceptic politicization as ‘post-functionalist’ constraints that encourage differentiated European integration. This study argues that the relevance of Euroscepticism depends on who wins the domestic competition for government office. European mass politics are organized as delegation systems. These systems concentrate authority in the government and give little influence to parliaments and publics. If Eurosceptic parties reach the government, they will push for differentiation and even disintegration. If pro-EU parties succeed, uniform integration is likely to prevail. An empirical analysis of differentiated integration from the 1992 Maastricht Treaty to the 2016 Single Resolution Fund shows that only government Euroscepticism – rather than opposition, extra-parliamentary, or popular Euroscepticism – encourages differentiation. This study explains how uniform integration can prevail even in ostensibly Eurosceptic countries. It suggests that the impact of Eurosceptic politicization depends on party competition and is often more limited than might seem at first sight. (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • Dutceac Segesten, A., and Bossetta, M. Can Euroscepticism Contribute to a European Public Sphere? The Europeanization of Media Discourses on Euroscepticism across Six Countries // JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies (2019) nr 5, lk. 1051– 1070.
    This study compares the media discourses on euroscepticism in 2014 in six countries (the UK, Ireland, France, Spain, Sweden and Denmark). We assessed the extent to which the mass media’s reporting of euroscepticism indicates the Europeanization of public spheres. Using a mixed‐methods approach combining latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) topic modelling and qualitative coding, we find that approximately 70 per cent of print articles mentioning ‘euroscepticism’ or ‘eurosceptic’ are framed in a non‐domestic (i.e., European) context. In five of the six cases studied, articles exhibiting a European context are strikingly similar in content, with the British case as the exception. However, coverage of British euroscepticism drives Europeanization in other member states. Bivariate logistic regressions further reveal three macro‐level structural variables that significantly correlate with a Europeanized media discourse: the newspaper type (tabloid or broadsheet), the presence of a strong domestic eurosceptical party and relationship to the EU budget (net contributor or receiver of EU funds). [Business Source Complete (EBSCO)]
  • Ripoll Servent, Ariadna ; Panning, Lara. Eurosceptics in trilogue settings: interest formation and contestation in the European Parliament // West European Politics (2019) nr 4, lk. 755-775.
    Trilogues have been studied as sites of secluded inter-institutional decision making that gather the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament (EP) and the European Commission. Trilogues, however, are not exempt from formal and informal party-political dynamics that affect intra- and inter-institutional contestation. The increase in Eurosceptics in the 2014 EP elections offers an opportunity to investigate their efforts to shape the position and behaviour of the EP negotiating team in trilogues. Therefore, this article investigates to what extent Eurosceptic party groups participate in trilogue negotiations and how mainstream groups deal with their presence. The analysis shows that the opportunities to participate in trilogues and shape the EP’s position are higher for those perceived as soft Eurosceptic MEPs, while mainstream groups apply a ‘cordon sanitaire’ to those perceived as being part of hard Eurosceptic groups – which reduces the chances of MEPs from those groups being willing to participate in parliamentary work. (Paberkandjal; Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • van Bohemen, Samira ; de Koster, Willem ; van der Waal, Jeroen. Euroscepticism among Dutch Leftist and Rightist Populist Constituencies: How can the U‐Curve be Understood? // JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies (2019) nr 2, lk. 371-387.
    The U‐curve in euroscepticism is well established: both leftist and rightist populist constituencies are more eurosceptic than voters for establishment parties. Using rich survey data on a country with both constituencies represented in parliament (the Netherlands; n=1,296), we examine why euroscepticism drives populist voting. Our analyses demonstrate that euroscepticism is part of the well‐established link between both 1) distrust in politics and politicians, and 2) support for protectionism on the one hand, and voting for both types of populist party on the other. It is also part of the well‐known relationship between 3) ethnocentrism and rightist populist voting. Surprisingly, euroscepticism is not part of the typical association between economic egalitarianism and voting for a leftist populist party. The concluding section discusses the implications of our findings and provides suggestions for further research. [Business Source Complete (EBSCO)]

Comparative Political Studies. Special Issue: Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective (2018) nr 13. (Sage Journals Onlines)

  • Mudde, Cas ; Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira. Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda. – lk. 1667 – 1693.
    Academics are increasingly using the concept of populism to make sense of current events such as the Brexit referendum and the Trump presidency. This is certainly a welcome development, but two shortcomings can be observed in the contemporary debate. On one hand, new populism scholars often start from scratch and do not build upon the existing research. On the other hand, those who have been doing comparative research on populism stay in their comfort zone and thus do not try to link their work to other academic fields. In this article, we address these two shortcomings by discussing some of the advantages of the so-called ideational approach to the comparative study of populism and by pointing out four avenues of future research, which are closely related to some of the contributions of this special issue, namely, (a) economic anxiety, (b) cultural backlash, (c) the tension between responsiveness and responsibility, and (d) (negative) partisanship and polarization.
  • Gest, Justin ; Reny, Tyler ; Mayer, Jeremy. Roots of the Radical Right: Nostalgic Deprivation in the United States and Britain. – lk. 1694 – 1719.
    Following trends in Europe over the past decade, support for the Radical Right has recently grown more significant in the United States and the United Kingdom. While the United Kingdom has witnessed the rise of Radical Right fringe groups, the United States’ political spectrum has been altered by the Tea Party and the election of Donald Trump. This article asks what predicts White individuals’ support for such groups. In original, representative surveys of White individuals in Great Britain and the United States, we use an innovative technique to measure subjective social, political, and economic status that captures individuals’ perceptions of increasing or decreasing deprivation over time. We then analyze the impact of these deprivation measures on support for the Radical Right among Republicans (Conservatives), Democrats (Labourites), and Independents. We show that nostalgic deprivation among White respondents drives support for the Radical Right in the United Kingdom and the United States.
  • Rooduijn, Matthijs ; Burgoon, Brian. The Paradox of Well-being: Do Unfavorable Socioeconomic and Sociocultural Contexts Deepen or Dampen Radical Left and Right Voting Among the Less Well-Off?. – lk. 1720 – 1753.
    Radical left and right parties are increasingly successful—particularly among the less well-off. We assess the extent to which this negative effect of well-being on radical voting is moderated by contextual factors. Our study suggests that less well-off citizens vote for radical parties mainly under favorable aggregate-level circumstances. We distinguish two possible mechanisms underlying this effect—relative deprivation and risk aversion—and find support for relative deprivation only among radical right voters and for risk aversion for both types of radical voters, yet with predictable differences between the radical left and right supporter bases. Economic hardship leads to radical right voting when the socioeconomic circumstances are favorable and to radical left voting when net migration is modest. Our findings suggest a genuine paradox of radicalism: individual economic suffering might foster left and right radicalism, but mainly when that suffering takes place amid favorable conditions at the aggregate level.
  • Singer, Matthew. Delegating Away Democracy: How Good Representation and Policy Successes Can Undermine Democratic Legitimacy. – lk. 1754 – 1788.
    Theories of democratic legitimacy argue that people who believe the government is well managed and represents their interests are likely to defend the democratic status quo. Principal-agent theory predicts, however, that these same groups are also more likely to support executive actions that threaten vertical or horizontal accountability. Citizens who feel represented by an ideologically sympathetic and competent executive may be willing to delegate the president additional authority to enact their agenda, even at the expense of democratic principles. Survey data from Latin America are largely consistent with the principal-agent hypothesis; those who voted for the ruling party in the previous election or who perceive that the economy is strong say they not only like democracy and oppose coups but also support limits on critical actors and opposition parties and are willing to let the president bypass the legislature and court. Thus to understand the breakdown of democracy, we must not only examine the conditions that leave the losers of political and economic processes satisfied with the process that culminated in their defeat but also identify conditions when winners tolerate electoral and institutional challenges and are willing to protect space for public criticism.
  • Homola, Jonathan ; Tavits, Margit. Contact Reduces Immigration-Related Fears for Leftist but Not for Rightist Voters. – 1789 – 1820.
    How does contact with nonnatives affect immigration-related fears? While there is strong general support for the argument that intergroup contact decreases intergroup prejudice and fear, previous research arrives at mixed conclusions when applying this argument to the study of natives’ attitudes toward immigrants. We propose that people’s preexisting partisan affinities condition the effect of contact, which may explain the mixed findings. Building on the literature on motivated reasoning, we argue that contact reduces immigration-related threats among leftist voters, but have a threat-increasing or no effect among rightist voters. We find support for our argument using original surveys conducted in two very different contexts: the United States and Germany.


  • Baute, Sharon ; Meuleman, Bart ; Abts, Koen. European integration as a threat to social security: Another source of Euroscepticism? // European Union Politics (2018) nr. 2, lk. 209–232.
    This study investigates whether citizens’ concerns about the EU’s impact on social security are a distinct source of Euroscepticism. By analysing data from the European Values Study 2008, we show that citizens differentiate between domain-specific fears about European integration (i.e. about social security, national sovereignty, culture, payments and jobs), meaning that they cannot be reduced completely to a general fear about European integration. Furthermore, socioeconomic determinants and ideological position are more important in explaining citizens’ fear about the EU’s impact on social security than in explaining their generalised fear of European integration. In countries with higher social spending, citizens are more fearful of European integration in general, however, social spending does not affect fears about social security more strongly than it affects other EU-related fears. (Sage Journals Onlines)
  • Beckstein, Martin ; Rampton, Vanessa. Conservatism between theory and practice: The case of migration to Europe // European Journal of Political Research (2018) nr 4, lk. 1084-1102.
    This article explores the neglected relationship between conservatism as political theory and conservatism as political practice using the example of recent immigration to Europe. A cursory glance at how European politicians have responded to migration challenges suggests that they roughly divide into an open‐arm, leftist ‘liberal’ camp and a right‐wing ‘conservative’ one. The situation, however, is more complex. This article engages with the resources of conservative theory to argue that there are many distinct conservative theoretical positions for any one policy point. Using contemporary migration patterns as a case study, the findings suggest that Conservative parties have not borrowed much from conservative theory in its variety of incarnations. In fact, conservative theory can buttress a course of action that is generous toward migrants and at odds with the claims of right‐wing populist movements. While certain strands of conservatism imagine a homogenous people, there are others that are no less pro‐pluralism than liberal theories, and sometimes more so. [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO)]
  • Cavallaro, Matteo ; Flacher, David ; Zanetti, Massimo Angelo. Radical right parties and European economic integration: Evidence from the seventh European Parliament // European Union Politics (2018) nr. 2, lk. 321–343.
    This article explores the differences in radical right parties’ voting behaviour on economic matters at the European Parliament. As the literature highlights the heterogeneity of these parties in relation to their economic programmes, we test whether divergences survive the elections and translate into dissimilar voting patterns. Using voting records from the seventh term of the European Parliament, we show that radical right parties do not act as a consolidated party family. We then analyse the differences between radical right parties by the means of different statistical methods (NOMINATE, Ward’s clustering criterion, and additive trees) and find that these are described along two dimensions: the degree of opposition to the European Union and the classical left–right economic cleavage. We provide a classification of these parties compromising four groups: pro-welfare conditional, pro-market conditional, and rejecting. Our results indicate that radical right parties do not act as a party family at the European Parliament. This remains true regardless of the salience of the policy issues in their agendas. The article also derives streams for future research on the heterogeneity of radical right parties. (Sage Journals Online)
  • Harteveld, Eelco ; Steenvoorden, Eefje. The appeal of nostalgia: the influence of societal pessimism on support for populist radical right parties // West European Politics (2018) nr 1, lk. 28-52.
    In the literature, explanations of support for populist radical right (PRR) parties usually focus on voters’ socio-structural grievances, political discontent or policy positions. This article suggests an additional and possibly overarching explanation: societal pessimism. The central argument is that the nostalgic character of PRR ideology resonates with societal pessimism among its voters. Using European Social Survey data from 2012, the study compares levels of societal pessimism among PRR, radical left, mainstream left and mainstream right (MR) voters in eight European countries. The results show that societal pessimism is distributed in a tilted U-curve, with the highest levels indeed observed among PRR voters, followed by radical left voters. Societal pessimism increases the chance of a PRR vote (compared to a MR vote) controlling for a range of established factors. Further analyses show that societal pessimism is the only attitude on which MR and PRR voters take opposite, extreme positions. Finally, there is tentative evidence that societal pessimism is channelled through various more specific ideological positions taken by PRR voters, such as opposition to immigration. (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • Hoekman, Bernard ; Nelson, Douglas R. Reflecting on populism and the economics of globalization // Journal of International Business Policy (2018) aprill, lk.1-10.
    In this commentary, we take up two key elements of Dani Rodrik’s analysis of the economic underpinnings of populist politics. We focus on the links between globalization (especially trade integration) and populism and the role of global institutions (notably trade agreements) in both generating the economic pressures to which populist politicians are responding and in constraining the ability of governments to deal with adverse distributional effects of these pressures. We argue that it is important to distinguish between trade shocks and trade agreements; that the role of both is given too much weight relative to the effects of financialization and international capital flows, migration, and technological change; and that deepening international cooperation (global governance) can – and should – be part of the supply response to populism.
  • Jankowski, Michael ; Marcinkiewicz, Kamil. Are populist parties fostering women’s political representation in Poland? A comment on Kostadinova and Mikulska // Party politics (2018) nr. 2, lk. 185 – 196.
    In a recent contribution to Party Politics, Kostadinova and Mikulska analyze women’s political representation by populist parties in Poland and Bulgaria. The presented findings for Poland suggest that the main right-wing populist party PiS (1) elected more women to parliament, (2) nominated more women to promising ballot positions, and (3) that voters of PiS were more likely to support women in the elections compared to leftists parties. We disagree with all three findings. While the first finding is due to an error in the descriptive statistics, we argue that the other two findings are the result of an inappropriate research design. We replicate the analysis based on an altered research design and show that PiS did not elect more women to parliament, did not nominate more women to promising ballot positions and that voters of PiS were not more likely to vote for female candidates. (Sage Journals Onlines)
  • Loth, Wilfried. The Future of the European Union // Journal of European Integration History (2018) nr 2 lk. 269 – 278.
    The present crisis of the EU must be seen as part of a general crisis of parliamentary democracy. It is a crisis resulting from an extraordinary increase in change of societies, economic conditions and cultural contexts in an age of enforced globalization. Nevertheless, the chances are good that the exit of the Brits will not be the beginning of an overall disintegration of the Union. Instead, European society will become even more articulate. The current extent of the economic and financial links in the Union as well as the realities of globalization are permitting of no plausible alternative to the further development of the Community, at least no alternative with a lower cost. The decision of the British voters submitted the visions of the anti-Europeans on a test on the road, and this on-road test turned out negatively. Furthermore, the victory of Donald Trump at the US presidential elections and his ostentatious disregard for the values of the Western community let many Europeans feel that democratic order and open society were in danger and that they must be defended if they should subsist. Obviously, the Europeans – at least a clear majority of them – have in a moment of endangerment of the EU realized how high the stakes are. This brought them to appreciate the value of a common Europe once again and to engage themselves to defend this Union. (Nomos eLibrary)
  • McDonnell, Duncan ; Werner, Annika. Respectable radicals: why some radical right parties in the European Parliament forsake policy congruence // Journal of European Public Policy (2018) nr 5, lk. 747-763.
    Policy congruence has been identified as the main driver of European Parliament (EP) alliances. Yet, radical right parties are divided between three EP groups: European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR); Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD); Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF). This article investigates why four radical right parties in the ECR and EFDD – the Danish People’s Party, the Finns Party, the Sweden Democrats and UKIP – neither joined the apparently more ideologically homogenous ENF nor allied all with one another in 2014. Using Chapel Hill data, we find no policy logic explaining their alliance behaviour. Rather, our interviews with those in the parties indicate that they privileged national ‘respectability’ calculations when deciding alliance strategies. We therefore propose an alternative theory of EP group formation that sees some radical parties play a two-level game in which the perceived domestic ‘office’ and ‘votes’ benefits of European alliances outweigh those of ‘policy’.
    (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • Oesch, Daniel ; Rennwald, Line. Electoral competition in Europe’s new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre‐right and radical right // European Journal of Political Research (2018) nr 4, lk. 783-807.
    The rise of the radical right fundamentally changes the face of electoral competition in Western Europe. Bipolar competition is becoming tripolar, as the two dominant party poles of the twentieth century – the left and the centre‐right – are challenged by a third pole of the radical right. Between 2000 and 2015, the radical right has secured more than 12 per cent of the vote in over ten Western European countries. This article shows how electoral competition between the three party poles plays out at the micro level of social classes. It presents a model of class voting that distinguishes between classes that are a party’s preserve, classes that are contested strongholds of two parties and classes over which there is an open competition. Using seven rounds of the European Social Survey, it shows that sociocultural professionals form the party preserve of the left, and large employers and managers the preserve of the centre‐right. However, the radical right competes with the centre‐right for the votes of small business owners, and it challenges the left over its working‐class stronghold. These two contested strongholds attest to the co‐existence of old and new patterns of class voting. Old patterns are structured by an economic conflict: Production workers vote for the left and small business owners for the centre‐right based on their economic attitudes. In contrast, new patterns are linked to the rise of the radical right and structured by a cultural conflict. [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO)]
  • O´Neill, Michael. Challenges to the Western Liberal Order: The End of ‘the West’? // Journal of European Integration History (2018) nr 2, lk. 293 – 316.
    The liberal order that prevailed in the West after the end of the Second World War has recently been challenged from within as much as by external forces. The liberal internationalism and liberal democratic politics that defined the idea of ‘The West’ is now threatened on several fronts: by insurgent politics, not least the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom; by economic and ideological challenges to its role as the singular paradigm of globalization; and most recently by unilateralism from the present incumbent of the White House. Turbulent politics raises serious questions about the capacity of the Western liberal order to survive. Some commentators assert that to claim this is ‘crisis’ is exaggeration. Yet there is a case to answer. (Nomos eLibrary)
  • Rodrik, Dani. Populism and the economics of globalization // Journal of International Business Policy (2018)  veebruar, lk. 1-22.
    Populism may seem like it has come out of nowhere, but it has been on the rise for a while. I argue that economic history and economic theory both provide ample grounds for anticipating that advanced stages of economic globalization would produce a political backlash. While the backlash may have been predictable, the specific form it took was less so. I distinguish between left-wing and right-wing variants of populism, which differ with respect to the societal cleavages that populist politicians highlight. The first has been predominant in Latin America, and the second in Europe. I argue that these different reactions are related to the relative salience of different types of globalization shocks.
  • Schmidt, Franzisca. Drivers of Populism: A Four-country Comparison of Party Communication in the Run-up to the 2014 European Parliament Elections // Political Studies (2018) nr. 2.
    The aim of this article is to analyse what different types of populist communication styles emerged during the 2014 European Parliament election campaign and under which conditions political parties selected specific populist communication styles. To do this, a comparative quantitative content analysis of press releases in the run-up of the latest European Parliament elections has been conducted for parties in France, Germany, Austria and Greece. The article presents a definition of populism based on the contemporary academic discourse, which focuses on the transnational nature of the European political field. It is shown that populist party communication is more pronounced on the fringes of the political spectrum and in countries struggling with severe macroeconomic difficulties. Contrary to intuitive expectations, the perceived populist rhetoric of exclusivity in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, which is identified as a central feature of right-wing populism, barely takes place within populist party communication. [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO) ; Sage Journals]
  • Stockemer, Daniel. French activists to the (radical) right and the (radical) left: are they different or similar? // European Societies (2018) nr 2, lk. 183-206.
    This research aims at detecting commonalities and differences between right-wing and left-wing activists. Based on 44 interviews with members of the French National Front (FN) and 88 Attac activists, I find that Attac activists are individuals with high amounts of civic skills that have been politically socialised until the age of 25. Somewhat different, my interview research indicates that the socialisation mechanisms of FN members, as well as their social and educational backgrounds are diverse. Pertaining to the activists’ values, the two groups expose values at the opposite end of the political spectrum. Whereas left-wing activists respond to globalisation and neo-liberalism by highlighting national and international solidarity and participatory democracy, the radical right-wing members respond to the same phenomena by propagating nationalism, authoritarianism and protectionist policies. Finally, I find that left-wing activists are driven by instrumental and ideological considerations, whereas right-wing activists are motivated by ideology as well as identity processes. (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • Van Hauwaert, Steven M. ; Van Kessel, Stijn. Beyond protest and discontent: A cross-national analysis of the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist party support // European Journal of Political Research (2018) nr 1, lk. 68–92.
    Studies on populist parties – or ‘supply-side populism’ more generally – are numerous. Nevertheless, the connection with demand-side dynamics, and particularly the populist characteristics or tendencies of the electorate, requires more scholarly attention. This article examines in more detail the conditions underlying the support for populist parties, and in particular the role of populist attitudes amongst citizens. It asks two core questions: (1) are populist party supporters characterised by stronger populist attitudes than other party supporters, and (2) to what extent do populist (and other) attitudes contribute to their party preference? The analysis uses fixed effect models and relies on a cross-sectional research design that uses unique survey data from 2015 and includes nine European countries. The results are threefold. First, in line with single-country studies, populist attitudes are prominent among supporters of left- and right-wing populist parties in particular. Second, populist attitudes are important predictors of populist party support in addition to left-wing socioeconomic issue positions for left-wing populist parties, and authoritarian and anti-immigration issue positions for right-wing populist parties. Third, populist attitudes moderate the effect of issue positions on the support for populist parties, particularly for individuals whose positions are further removed from the extreme ends of the economic or cultural policy scale. These findings suggest that strong populist attitudes may encourage some voters to support a populist party whose issue positions are incongruous with their own policy-related preferences. [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO)]
  • van der Waal, Jeroen ; de Koster, Willem. Populism and Support for Protectionism: The Relevance of Opposition to Trade Openness for Leftist and Rightist Populist Voting in The Netherlands // Political Studies (2018) nr 3, lk. 560-576.
    Leftist and rightist populist parties in Western Europe both oppose trade openness. Is support for economic protectionism also relevant for their electorates? We assess this in the Netherlands, where both types of populist parties have seats in parliament. Analyses of representative survey data (n = 1,296) demonstrate that support for protectionism drives voting for such parties, as do the well-established determinants of political distrust (both populist constituencies), economic egalitarianism (leftist populist constituency) and ethnocentrism (rightist populist constituency). Surprisingly, support for protectionism does not mediate the relationship between economic egalitarianism and voting for left-wing populists, or the link between political distrust and voting for either left-wing or right-wing populist parties. In contrast, support for protectionism partly mediates the association between ethnocentrism and voting for right-wing populists. We discuss the largely independent role of protectionism in populist voting in relation to the cultural cleavage in politics and electoral competition, and also provide suggestions for future research. [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO)]
  • Adam, Silke ; Antl-Wittenberg, Eva-Maria (et al.). Strategies of pro-European parties in the face of a Eurosceptic challenge // European Union Politics (2017) nr. 2, lk. 260 – 282.
    We ask how pro-European parties communicate in the face of a Eurosceptic challenge and how this affects the politicization of European Union integration within a country. We draw on a quantitative content analysis of parties’ press releases issued in the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament elections in seven countries. Our results show that pro-European parties as such put Europe on the agenda, debate issues similar to those voiced by Eurosceptics and defend their pro-European positions: yet, they do so to varying degrees and with major exceptions. It is pro-European catch-all parties with strong internal dissent that silence Europe and choose blurring or adoption strategies. Consequently, the politicization of European integration varies among countries, thereby high topic visibility is accompanied by low levels of party conflict. (Sage Journals Onlines)
  • Allen, Trevor J. All in the party family? Comparing far right voters in Western and Post-Communist Europe // Party Politics (2017) nr. 3, lk. 274-285.
    Scholarship on far right parties in Post-Communist Europe has borrowed findings and analytical frameworks from studies on the Western European far right. Similarly, studies on Western European far right parties have increasingly referenced instances of far right success in post-communist states. These parties are similar in their Euroskepticism and exclusionary populism. However, little work has compared voters for the far right between regions. Different political opportunity structures have consequences for far right voter profiles in four important respects. First, the linkage between anti-immigrant attitudes and far right support is stronger in Western Europe. Second, far right voters in Western Europe are less religious than their post-communist counter-parts. Third, post-communist far right voters are economic leftists, whereas rightist attitudes toward income redistribution slightly predict a far right vote in Western Europe. Finally, far right voters in Western Europe are more satisfied with democracy as a regime type. (Sage Journals Onlines)
  • Baldini, Gianfranco. Populism in Europe: everywhere and nowhere? // European Political Science (2017) nr. 2, lk. 258–262.
    [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO), ProQuest Research Library]
  • Džankić, Jelena. State-sponsored Populism and the Rise of Populist Governance: The Case of Montenegro // Journal of Balkan & Near Eastern Studies (2017) nr. 4, lk. 403-418.
    Ever since it became independent in 2006, Montenegro has steadily progressed in its ambition to accede to the European Union. Even so, a new form of populism, dominated by neither a far-right nor a far-left discourse, but controlled by leading political elites in the country’s government has developed in Montenegro.  This form of populism is not a mechanism of ensuring the dominance of the Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska Partija Socijalista Crne Gore, DPS) in Montenegro per se. Instead it is used as a tool to support and enhance other mechanisms that the party utilizes in order to stay in power and remain the dominant force in the country.  Hence, we can observe the growth of a new kind of populism, a state-sponsored populist discourse that is very different from populism as understood in Western Europe. What we find in Montenegro is a government that uses populist language and messages to support a clientelistic state system.  [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO)]
  • Freeden, Michael. After the Brexit referendum: revisiting populism as an ideology // Journal of Political Ideologies (2017) nr. 1, lk. 1-11.
    The author reflects on the British Referendum on membership of the European Union and the refugees in Europe in 2016. He states that the criticism of refugees and migrants in Great Britain. An overview of the Brexit 2016, liberalism, economic development, Parliamentary approval and populism is also given. [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO), ProQuest Research Library]
  • Leruth, Benjamin ; Startin, Nicholas. Between Euro-Federalism, Euro-Pragmatism and Euro-Populism: the Gaullist movement divided over Europe // Modern & Contemporary France (2017) nr.  2, lk. 153-169.
    Since the creation of the European Community, the Gaullist movement has never been united over the question of European integration. De Gaulle’s intergovernmental vision of the European project has largely been the dominant discourse. At times however, this narrative has been questioned—on the one hand by more supranational notions of European integration; and on the other by a more pro-sovereignty Eurosceptic discourse. Subsequently, in its various modern-day guises the Gaullist movement has faced a series of major internal divisions with regard to its position on ‘Europe’. This uncertainty has also manifested itself at the highest level as demonstrated by the changing discourse advocated by former French presidents Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy. This paper analyses the internal tensions over the European issue within the Gaullist movement at elite level. It determines that despite Chirac’s and Sarkozy’s attempts to unite the party throughout their presidencies the Gaullist movement is far from having moved towards a united European stance. Accordingly, the authors identify that over the past three decades, it is possible to identify three distinct, and at times conflicting, Gaullist stances on European integration with which the party’s elites have vacillated, namely Euro-Federalism, Euro-Pragmatism and Euro-Populism. [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO)]
  • Miller, Bowman H. Tomorrow’s Europe: a never closer union // Journal of European Integration (2017) nr. 4, lk. 421-433.
    Europe is beset with multiple, intersecting challenges and crises, among them unwelcome inward migration, suffocating indebtedness in the southern tier, rising populist nationalism evident from Britain and France to Hungary and Poland, and residue from the 2008 economic/euro crisis, to name the more prominent ones.
    Less noticed or commented is the European Union’s need to readdress its foundational rationale and to adapt it to contemporary reality. Its original stated aim to share sovereignty and pursue supra-national integration in an effort to prevent renewed intra-European warfare is no longer relevant, and today’s electorates demand both more say and new justification behind elites’ calls for continuing integration to shore up the EU’s edifice and ensure its institutional future. (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • Pirro, Andrea L. P. ; van Kessel, Stijn. United in opposition? The populist radical right’s EU-pessimism in times of crisis // Journal of European Integration (2017) nr. 4, lk. 405-420.
    Populist radical right (PRR) parties are typically critical of European integration. They deem the EU an elitist project and consider European integration a threat to national sovereignty. In practice, however, PRR parties’ positions on the EU have varied across countries and periods. Our article assesses whether, and how, PRR parties have changed their ‘EU-pessimist’ discourse following the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis. The crisis has ostensibly provided scope for PRR parties across Europe to bolster their EU-pessimism and place more emphasis on socioeconomic frames. We analyse the evolution of the PRR’s discourse in five countries. The article shows that, although PRR parties have generally brought the crisis into their discourses, they have responded to it in different ways, displaying varying degrees of EU-pessimism. These responses were partly informed by the opportunities provided by their contexts, but ostensibly more so by the strategic considerations of PRR party leaderships. (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • Rashkova, Ekaterina R. ; Zankina, Emilia. Are (populist) radical right parties Männerparteien? Evidence from Bulgaria // West European Politics (2017) nr. 4, lk. 848-868.
    This paper focuses on the representation of women in radical right parties and examines the often assumed relationship between the radical right and gender, namely that radical right parties are overwhelmingly ran, supported by, and representing the male part of the population. Using data from elections, party platforms, and parliamentary committees the paper asks ‘Are PRR parties Männerparteien?’ Using data from Bulgaria, we suggest that the Männerparteien argument is too simplistic and argue that in order to make a claim about representation, one needs to study both female and male MPs and across all party families. We find that while radical right parties are still primarily composed of men, an examination of the substantive representation of women’s issues, puts this relationship into question. Furthermore, we show that while men outnumber women in all political parties, both radical right women and men have been more active in women’s issues than their gender counterparts from other political parties. These findings suggest two things: one, we cannot study gender equality matters without comparing the activity of both men and women; and two, the classification of radical right parties as Männerparteien based on descriptive representation only, is too simplistic and to an extent, misleading.  (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • Rooduijn, Matthijs ; Burgoon, Brian ; van Elsas, Erika J. Radical distinction: Support for radical left and radical right parties in Europe // European Union Politics (2017) nr 4, lk. 536-559.
    Support for radical parties on both the left and right is on the rise, fueling intuition that both radicalisms have similar underpinnings. Indeed, existing studies show that radical left and right voters have overlapping positions and preferences. In this article, however, we focus on the differences in the voting bases of such parties. We show that radical left and right voters have sharply diverging ideological profiles. When it comes to the historical traditions of the ‘left’ and ‘right’, these voters differ radically from each other. Both groups express the traditions associated with their mainstream counterparts—particularly with respect to (non-)egalitarian, (non-)altruistic, and (anti-)cosmopolitan values. Such differences also explain why radical left voters tend to be more, not less, educated than mainstream or radical right voters. (Sage Journals Onlines)
  • Вайнштейн Г. И. Современный популизм как объект политологического анализа // ПОЛИС. Политические исследования (2017) nr. 4, lk. 69-89.
    С усилением в современном мире тенденций популистской политики изучение сущности современного популизма приобретает возрастающее научное значение. В статье рассматриваются основные направления политологического осмысления феномена глобального подъема популизма. Отмечаются методологические трудности концептуализации понятия популизм, осложняющие анализ многообразных манифестаций этого явления и оценку количественных параметров и качественных характеристик популистских сил в Европе. В то же время описываются некоторые особенности происходящих в последнее время изменений типологической структуры популизма. Излагая понимание политологами движущих сил расширения массовой базы популизма, автор подчеркивает доминирование в академической литературе мнений об усилении роли факторов этнокультурного характера. Особое внимание уделяется трактовке современной политологией отношений между популизмом и демократией. В заключении характеризуются основные тенденции связанных с популизмом трансформаций западного партийно-политического ландшафта. (Paberväljaanne)
  • Глухова А. В. Популизм как политический феномен: вызов современной демократии // ПОЛИС. Политические исследования (2017) nr. 4, lk. 49-68.
    Автор проводит политический анализ феномена современного популизма, его природы и разновидностей, исследует органическую взаимосвязь популизма с новыми условиями существования политики, продиктованными эпохой постмодерна и спецификой “постдемократии” (К. Крауч). В статье выявляются исторические корни современного популизма и порождающие его структурные факторы (среди которых кризис общественного плюрализма и распад среднего класса). Уделяется внимание таким важнейшим компонентам популистских движений, как органическая поляризующая идеология, противопоставляющая большинство меньшинству и ведущая к критике представительных институтов, и яркий лидер, способный превратить народное недовольство и протесты в стратегию мобилизации масс ради завоевания власти. (Paberväljaanne)
  • Baier, Walter. Europe on the Precipice: The Crisis of the Neoliberal Order and the Ascent of Right-Wing Populism // New Labor Forum (2016) nr. 3, lk. 48-55.
    The article discusses the crisis of neoliberal order and the growing right-wing populism in Europe. Topics discussed include distinction between right-wing extremism and right-wing radicalism, the question of whether right-wing racicalism facism can be modernized, and the struggle against right-wing extremism and neo-Nazism. [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO), Business Source Complete (EBSCO), ProQuest Research Library]
  • Bakker, Bert N. ; Rooduijn, Matthijs ; Schumacher, Gijs. The psychological roots of populist voting: Evidence from the United States, the Netherlands and Germany // European Journal of Political Research (2016) nr. 2, lk. 302–320.
    What are the psychological roots of support for populist parties or outfits such as the Tea Party, the Dutch Party for Freedom or Germany’s Left Party? Populist parties have as a common denominator that they employ an anti-establishment message, which they combine with some ‘host’ ideology. Building on the congruency model of political preference, it is to be expected that a voter’s personality should match with the message and position of his or her party. This article theorises that a low score on the personality trait Agreeableness matches the anti-establishment message and should predict voting for populist parties. Evidence is found for this hypothesis in the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. The relationship between low Agreeableness and voting for populist parties is robust, controlling for other personality traits, authoritarianism, sociodemographic characteristics and ideology. Thus, explanations of the success of populism should take personality traits into account.  [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO)]
  • Immerzeel, Tim ; Lubbers, Marcel ; Coffé, Hilde. Competing with the radical right // Party Politics (2016) nr. 6, lk. 823-834.
    The popularity of European Radical Right Populist parties (RRPs) has led to investigations into the distances between RRPs’ and other parties’ stances regarding immigration. This article adds to this literature by investigating the distance between RRPs and the other parties on a wider variety of typical RRP policy and style issues. Based on an Expert Survey organized in 2010, we consider ideological (immigration, nationalism, law and order) and style (anti-establishment, populism) dimensions. Furthermore, we examine to what extent characteristics of other parties and RRPs (ideological position, electoral success, being in office) are associated with these distances. Our results show that right-wing (neo-)conservative and Christian-democratic parties are closest, while green and socialist parties are furthest to RRPs regarding ideological dimensions. The opposite is found for the style dimensions. Additionally, we show that the other parties’ characteristics, rather than those of RRPs, are associated with ideological and style distances between RRPs and other parties. (Sage Journals Onlines)
  • van Kessel, Stijn ;  Castelein, Remco. Shifting the blame. Populist politicians’ use of Twitter as a tool of opposition // Journal of Contemporary European Research (2016) nr. 2.
    The advent of new social media has facilitated new means of political communication, through which politicians can address the electorate in an unmediated way. This article concentrates on political actors challenging the establishment, for whom new media platforms such as Twitter provide new tools to engage in a ‘permanent campaign’ against dominant mainstream parties. Such opposition is ostensibly articulated most strongly by populist parties, which can be seen as the ultimate challengers to the (political) ‘elites’. By means of two often-identified cases of populism in the Netherlands (the radical right Freedom Party and left-wing Socialist Party), this study explores how populist party leaders use Twitter messages (tweets) to give form to their adversarial rhetoric in practice. Irrespective of the different ways in which the politicians utilised the medium, our study shows that Twitter can serve as a valuable source to study the oppositional discourse of populist parties, and (shifting) party strategies more generally.  (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals)
  • Schumacher, Gijs ; van Kersbergen, Kees. Do mainstream parties adapt to the welfare chauvinism of populist parties? // Party Politics (2016) nr. 3, lk. 300-312.
    Populist parties increasingly take a welfare chauvinistic position. They criticize mainstream parties for cutting and slashing welfare at the expense of the ‘native’ population and to the benefit of the ‘undeserving’ immigrant. Given the electoral success of populist parties, we investigate whether and when mainstream parties ignore, attack or accommodate welfare chauvinism. Using key theories of party behaviour, we test whether mainstream parties (1) respond immediately to populist parties, (2) respond with a time lag, or (3) respond only when they lose elections or are in opposition. Our quantitative analyses of party manifestos, speeches and policies of European mainstream and populist parties (1980–2012) show that mainstream parties adapt to populist parties on welfare chauvinism, but which parties adapt and when varies significantly. In our in-depth examinations of the Dutch and Danish cases, we highlight important cross-country and cross-party differences. (Sage Journals Onlines)
  • Spruyt, Bram ; Keppens,  Gil ; Van Droogenbroeck, Filip. Who supports populism and what attracts people to it? // Political Research Quarterly (2016) nr 2, lk 335–346.
    In this paper, we engage with the emerging literature that studies the support for populism by means of attitudes among the public at large. More specifically, our paper has two objectives. First, we extend recent research by Akkerman et al. by showing that their measure performs rather well in a context that differs from the one it was originally formulated in. Data from Flanders (the Dutch speaking part of Belgium, N = 1,577) also demonstrate that the support for populism can be empirically distinguished from feelings of lack of external political efficacy. Second, this is one of the first studies that assess who supports populism and why they do so. We show that populism is embedded in deep feelings of discontent, not only with politics but also with societal life in general. Moreover, we demonstrate that populism is strongest supported by stigmatized groups who face difficulties in finding a positive social identity. In the conclusion, we discuss the implications of our findings. (Research Library, Sage Journals Onlines)


  • Kehrberg, Jason E. The demand side of support for radical right parties // Comparative European Politics (2015) nr.5, lk. 553–576.
    This study examines the link between individual attitudes and voting for radical right parties in 16 European countries, using the European Social Survey (ESS). This study includes, in a single model, several different components of the radical right political platform in order to test which components are more strongly found among radical right voters. Using the initial assumption that the anti-immigrant message of radical right parties should be attractive to individuals with similar predispositions, I use the ESS to find evidence that radical right voters are attracted to these parties because of the political message of immigration attitudes and anti-democratic attitudes. Further, depending on the context, social conservatism is associated with radical right support. In sum, radical right support is based on multiple factors with immigration attitudes as the primary consideration, with populism and social conservatism playing a minor but significant role.  (ProQuest Research Library)


  • Corduwener, Pepijn. The Populist Conception of Democracy beyond Popular Sovereignty // Journal of Contemporary European Research (2014) nr. 4.
    With populist parties making electoral progress across the European continent, the question of what their electoral success means for contemporary democratic systems has gained increasing significance. This article investigates how two populist radical right parties, the Austrian FPÖ and the Dutch PVV, conceptualise democracy, based on a wide range of party documents released over recent decades. It builds upon recent academic consensus that the relationship between populism and democracy is best understood from a ‘minimalist’ perspective, seeing populism not as antagonistic to democracy, but as an ideology that conceptualises democracy primarily in terms of popular sovereignty. The article adds to the existing literature by demonstrating that we can extend this understanding of the populist conception of democracy in three aspects: the populist emphasis on state neutrality; a two-fold notion of equality; and the extension of the political sphere in society. Based upon these three issues, the article concludes by exploring how the populist conception of democracy relates to the most dominant form of democracy practised nowadays, liberal democracy, and to what extent it reflects changes in our democratic political culture.  (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals)
  • Kriesi, Hanspeter. The Populist Challenge // West European Politics (2014) nr. 2, lk. 361-378.
    Populism has been on the rise for some time in Europe now, and its rise has been one of the key concerns of Peter Mair. He has linked it to the increasing erosion of the representative function of European party systems. The spectre that haunted him was ‘partyless democracy’, a democratic regime where parties had lost their representative function, which opened the door for unmediated populist protest. While largely sharing his interpretation of the overall structural trends giving rise to the populist challenges in Western Europe, the article is critical of the static character of his assessment. It suggests that there are three forms of ‘protest populism’, all of which may eventually end up transforming the West European party systems in the name of the new structuring conflicts that characterise contemporary European societies. In addition, it proposes to extend the scope of Peter’s argument to the less established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)
  • van Ostaijen, Mark ; Scholten, Peter. Policy populism? Political populism and migrant integration policies in Rotterdam and Amsterdam // Comparative European Politics (2014) nr 6, lk. 680–699.
    The political presence of populist parties has increased in Western Europe since the early 1980s. But populism cannot be limited to a political phenomenon only. However, in scholarly research the political aspects of populism take precedence over the policy aspects. The focus of this article is to what extent policy populism exists and if there is a relation between political populism on policy populism in the area of migrant integration policies. A combination of a qualitative discourse analysis and a quantitative content analysis is used for the analysis of both political and policy documents in two Dutch local case studies, the cities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. By focussing on populism as relational concept and as discursive ordering, we show that the presence of policy populism is not dependent on political populism. Rather, there seem to be some elective affinities. Next to this, this article shows shifting discourses towards more inclusive-civic ingroups and exclusive-ethnic outgroups. This study shows the gradual sifts, presences and potentials of populist discourse in local politics and especially policies and the emergence of ethnic specificity in regard to these distancing discourses.  (ProQuest Research Library)
  • Rooduijn, Matthijs ; de Lange, Sarah L ; van der Brug, Wouter. A populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion by populist parties in Western Europe // Party Politics (2014) nr. 4, lk. 563-575. 13p.
    In this article, we examine the programmatic reactions to the rise of populist parties. It has been argued that populism is not necessarily the prerogative of populist parties; it has been adopted by mainstream parties as well. The article investigates whether populism is contagious. On the basis of the results of a content analysis of election manifestos of parties in five Western European countries (France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom), we conclude that the programmes of mainstream parties have not become more populist in recent years. We find no evidence that mainstream parties change their programmes when confronted with electoral losses or successful populist challengers. Yet, we do find that populist parties change their own programmes when they have been successful: Their initial success makes them tone down their populism. (Sage Journals Onlines)
  • Stavrakakis, Yannis ; Katsambekis, Giorgos. Left-wing populism in the European periphery: the case of SYRIZA // Journal of Political Ideologies (2014) nr.  2, lk. 119-142.
    Due to its electoral performance in the 2012 general elections, SYRIZA, a previously unknown Greek political formation of the radical left, gained unprecedented visibility within the European public sphere. How is this strong showing and the political message articulated by SYRIZA to be interpreted? Utilizing a discursive methodology, this paper puts to the test the two assumptions predominating in most available analyses, namely that SYRIZA articulates a populist rhetoric, that it constitutes a predominantly populist force; and, given the near-exclusive association of populism with extreme right-wing movements, that SYRIZA constitutes a populist danger for Europe. Our analysis concludes that SYRIZA’s discourse is indeed a distinct articulation of left-wing populism. However, this by no means vindicates the second part of the prevailing wisdom: SYRIZA’s portrayal as a dangerous force threatening fundamental European values. If, however, this is the case, then mainstream research orientations in the study of European populism may have to be reviewed. [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO), ProQuest Research Library]
  • Vasilopoulou, Sofia (et al.). Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame // Journal of Common Market Studies (2014) nr. 2, lk. 388-402.
    Within the broader debate on the Greek crisis, the theory of ‘populist democracy’ postulates that populism is fundamental to the sustenance of the Greek political system and is at the heart of Greece’s endemic domestic weaknesses. This article tests this assumption empirically through the use of a sophisticated framing analysis of speeches delivered by the leaders of the five parties in the Greek parliament in the period 2009–11. The findings confirm that populism: (a) is expressed through the narratives of political actors; (b) is observed across the party system; (c) is expressed in the forms of blame-shifting and exclusivity; and (d) differs depending on position in the party system. The article contributes to the debate by testing and building on the theory of democratic populism, providing a novel way of measuring and operationalizing populism and identifying a new typology that distinguishes between mainstream and fringe populism. [Business Source Complete (EBSCO)]


  • Gómez-Reino, Margarita. The Populist Radical Right and European Integration: A Comparative Analysis of Party–Voter Links // West European Politics (2013) nr. 4, lk. 789-816.
    This article analyses the links between populist radical right parties and their voters regarding European integration in 11 European countries. It does so by using data from the 2008 European Social Survey and the 2006 UNC-Chapel Hill Expert Data Base on political parties and European integration. In addition to mapping the Eurosceptic orientations of political parties and their voters, the article examines the degree to which attitudes towards the EU and voting for populist radical parties are connected to each other. The results lend support to the hypothesis that most populist radical right parties have managed to establish links with their voters regarding European integration. The analysis also shows that links between populist radical right parties and their voters tend to be stronger for those parties that adopt more extreme negative positions towards European integration. (Taylor & Francis Journals Complete)


  • Dechezelles, Stephanie. Introduction: Is Populism a Side-Effect of European Integration? Radical Parties and the Europeanization of Political Competition // Perspectives on European Politics & Society (2010) nr. 3, lk. 229-236.
    Political radicalism has generated a large scholarly interest in recent years, both in Western and in Central Europe. Two series of explanations have been used to account for the success of radical parties in the scientific literature. The first one studies populism or radical politics through an analysis of electoral behaviour and/or radical groups’ strategies at the national level of government. The second perspective deals with the European dimension of radical politics and researches critical attitudes regarding European integration under the generic term Euroscepticism. These two approaches to political radicalism have developed simultaneously but in an isolated way from each one other. The case studies presented in this volume aim at bridging this gap by focusing on the links between the Europeanization of political competition on the one hand, and the rise of radical parties on the other hand, in selected member states of the enlarged European Union.
    [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO)]
  • Harmsen, Robert. Concluding Comment: On Understanding the Relationship between Populism and Euroscepticism // Perspectives on European Politics & Society (2010) nr. 3, lk. 333-341.
    The article discusses the relationship between populism in Europe, criticism of the European Union, and opposition to European integration (also known as Euroscepticism). The competition between opposing political parties in Europe is reviewed. The author questions whether the emergence of a political arena at the European level has created opportunities for the development of populist forms of politics. [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO)]
  • Reungoat, Emmanuelle. Anti-EU Parties and the People: An Analysis of Populism in French Euromanifestos // Perspectives on European Politics & Society (2010) nr.  3, lk. 292-312.
    The aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis that the opening of a European political space and the Europeanization of parties create a favourable arena for populist speech, themes and perhaps ideology, especially in the case of anti-EU parties. To do this, a quantitative study of populist speeches in French pro- and anti-EU party Euromanifestos has been conducted for the 1999 and 2004 European elections. It contributes to the scientific debate regarding the possible rise of a new political cleavage resulting from the European issue. Our comparative content analysis based on a coding system of populist discourse shows that there are no systematic links between the position of French parties towards the EU and their use of populist arguments, but a variety of relations, linked to the position of the parties within the party system as well as to the right/left cleavage. European issues are integrated in the ideologies and identities of the parties and only produce moderate effects on populist speeches. Therefore, party practices and speeches are stable. In some cases, what is evidenced is not a rise or a transformation of populist discourse, but national discourse patterns adapted to a European context and a phenomenon of Europeanization of certain populist themes. [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO)]
  • Startin, Nicholas. Where to for the Radical Right in the European Parliament? The Rise and Fall of Transnational Political Cooperation // Perspectives on European Politics & Society (2010) nr. 4, lk. 429-449.
    Amidst all the academic and media discussion in recent years of the causes and consequences of the rise in support for Radical Right parties (RRPs) in Europe, a related, but equally significant development, has generated less debate; namely the rise and fall in the European Parliament in 2007 of the trans-national Radical Right political group, Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty (ITS). Drawing on interviews with and a qualitative survey of former ITS members, as well as EP archival evidence, the paper begins by discussing why the notion of trans-national cooperation for Radical-Right political parties has proved difficult, and thus far has been doomed to failure, before analyzing the internal and external dynamics behind the rise and fall of the ITS group. Finally, the paper focuses on current collaboration among Radical Right parties post the June 2009 European elections and on the chances of a new trans-national far-right group emerging in the current parliament. [Academic Search Complete (EBSCO)]