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  • The 2016 Euro Plus Monitor: Coping with the Backlash / Lisbon Council, 2016.
    Most erstwhile euro crisis countries have adjusted rapidly and started to feel the first benefits of reform. Economic growth is close to its trend rate of 1.5% in the eurozone and unemployment is falling noticeably. The recovery is more broad-based and better entrenched than before. However, political populism poses a grave threat that could reverse the progress. This is the main finding of The 2016 Euro Plus Monitor: Coping with the Backlash, the much-awaited bi-annual competitiveness ranking published by the Lisbon Council and Berenberg. This year, the study is expanded and updated to cover all 28 European Union member states and includes special chapters on Brexit and the economic risks of populism.
  • Altomonte, Carlo ; Villafranca, Antonio. Europe in Identity Crisis: The Future of the EU in the Age of Nationalism / ISPI report, December 2019.
    Today’s European Union is in an identity crisis as it seems to be losing its points of reference. The principles that upheld its creation are being increasingly questioned around the world and within the EU itself. Its chances to survive hinge upon its ability to deliver at home and abroad, without abandoning its values and principles but rather adapting and re-launching them.
    This volume offers policy options on key questions for the future of the EU: How to scale-up its role abroad? How to benefit from new partners without severing ties with traditional allies such as the US? How to contain Eurosceptic forces by reducing inequalities? And how to reinforce the euro while aiming at more sustainable and balanced growth?
  • Balfour, Rosa ; Emmanouilidis, Janis A. et al. Europe’s troublemakers – The populist challenge to foreign policy / European Policy Centre, 2016.
    The growing intertwining of domestic and international politics is changing our understanding of both foreign relations and democratically legitimate government. At the same time, populist parties are thriving, challenging the status quo and the ruling elite, becoming the new ‘troublemakers’. As the transformative impact of populism on foreign relations has been little explored, this Report explores whether and how the populists are shaping the debate, and what the consequences might be for foreign policy-making in the EU. One thing seems certain: populism is here to stay, even if it ebbs and flows. Both left and right-wing populists are exploiting a crisis of democracy and legitimacy. Traditional politics thus needs to address the more deep-rooted malaise which is fueling discontent, rather than to stigmatise, mock or ignore its symptoms, or worse still, join the chorus of complainers.
  • Beck, Thorsten ; Underhill, Geoffrey. Quo Vadis? Identity, policy and the future of the European Union / VOX , 2017.
    The institutions and even the very idea of the EU are under fire, with feelings of disenfranchisement among large parts of the population driving support for populist movements across the continent. This column introduces a new eBook that brings together analyses of this multidimensional crisis and of the way out – the future of the European Union. A worryingly common message is that muddling through will not be enough to save the EU as a political project. ( e-raamatu lugemiseks on vajalik  registreerimine portaali kasutajaks)
  • Chryssogelos, AngelosOld Ghosts in New Sheets: European Populist Parties and Foreign Policy / Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 2011.
    This research paper analyses the foreign policy positions of five populist parties of the Right and Left in Western Europe. It focuses on foreign policy, an often ignored dimension of their ideas. It aims to fill a hole in policy debates by showing that European populism poses a coherent threat to mainstream politics, that foreign policy can be instrumental to the challenge mounted by populist parties against centrist politics and that the impact of those positions is practical and real for European states and the European Union.
  • Dittrich, Paul-Jasper. Social Networks and Populism in the EU : Comparative Study / Jacques Delors Institute, 2017.
    In the last years populist movements and parties across the EU have managed to use social networks increasingly as a platform for political communication and mobilization. This has allowed them to communicate directly with a steadily growing number of followers and distribute their political content to a mass audience. Why are populists seemingly so successful in communicating their messages via social networks? In this paper, Paul-Jasper Dittrich, research fellow at the Jacques Delors Institute – Berlin, offers an interpretation of populism as a political communication strategy in Germany, Italy, France and Spain. The analysis shows that populists have managed to establish social networks as a communication and mobilization tool in all four countries.
  • Dustmann, Christian ; Eichengreen, Barry ; Otten, Sebastian ; Sapir, André ; Tabellini, Guido ; Zoega, Gylfi. Europe’s Trust Deficit: Causes and Remedies / VOX, 2017.
    Has trust in political institutions in Europe fallen and populist politics risen to such levels that the European Union is at risk of disintegration? Could other countries follow the United Kingdom and leave the European Union? Or has the tide of populism and distrust in Europe receded and will Brexit be unique? This first report in the Monitoring International Integration series uses data from the European Social Survey on trust in national parliaments and in the European Union, disaggregated to the individual level and paired with information on regional macro variables such as GDP and unemployment, to identify economic and social characteristics associated with Europe’s growing trust deficit in some EU countries. The report also uses data on elections to the European Parliament, disaggregated to the regional level, to identify factors associated with support for non-mainstream political parties and movements labelled as “anti-EU”.
  • Emerson, Michael et al.  British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part II: Again, a huge contradiction between the evidence and Eurosceptic populism / Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2014.
    The British government has undertaken further reviews of EU policies: this second round yet again reveals the huge contradiction between the evidence collected from independent stakeholders and the arguments put forward by Eurosceptic populists. Of the reviews surveyed here one group concerns competences that the UK prioritises (internal market and external trade); a second group of competences where the UK has a leading position as beneficiary or as shaper of EU policies (research, transport and environment); and a third group where the UK has secured exceptional flexibility for itself to opt in or opt out (Schengen, civil justice). These findings are deliberately ignored by Eurosceptic populists, but may, with sustained information campaigns, gradually enter into the common sense of the population, especially when confronted with the stark choice of an ‘in or out’ referendum.
  • EU politics, extremist parties and populism / Council of the European Union, 2017.
    This special issue of the Council of the European Union’s Think Tank Review provides access to the full text of recent articles and papers (April 2016-April 2017) from major European think tanks on EU politics, focusing in particular on extremist parties and populism. The Review is compiled by the Library of the Council of the EU.
  • Euroscepticism in small EU member states / editor Kārlis Bukovskis ; [authors: Aldis Austers … et al. ; English language editor: Līvija Uskalis]. – Riga : Latvian Institute of International Affairs : Zinātne, 2016. – 159 lk.
    The book “Euroscepticism in Small EU Member States” is an effort by an international team of analysts to address the Euroscepticism phenomenon in small European Union Member States. It draws the general conclusions that the observed small countries of different enlargement periods, namely, Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Latvia, Bulgaria and Croatia, are realists in terms of reckoning the political and economic gains from the membership and future amendments of the EU policies. Although Eurosceptic ideas are not unfamiliar in any of the countries, calls for exiting the European Union are marginalised.
  • Falkner, Gerda. Populist radical right parties and EU policies : how coherent are their claims? / European University Institute: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2018.
    In recent national elections and in those to the European Parliament, populist radical right parties (PRRP) have gained many more votes than in previous decades. What could that mean, at least in the longer run, for EU activities in such areas as e.g. the Internal Market, social or environmental regulation, migration management, and defence? Beyond these parties’ general attitude of Euro-scepticism, we know close to nothing about their views regarding specific EU policies. Therefore, we have recently assembled and analysed a novel dataset of programmatic statements. In this paper, we discuss how (in-)coherent the policy-specific demands of different PRRPs within the European Union actually are. How much do they agree or disagree when it comes to reforming EU policies?
  • Fournier, Théo. From rhetoric to action : a constitutional analysis of populism / European University Institute, LAW Working Papers, 2018.
    Through this article, I analyse populism through the scope of constitutional law. It allows me first to underline the using, by populist parties, of a specific rhetoric which targets directly the two pillars of constitutional democracies: the rule of the majority and the rule-of-law. Populist rhetoric is, in my opinion, the much smaller common denominator to all populist parties. It consists in a fictional discourse aiming at convincing a fictional majority that constitutional democracy is at the origin of a tyranny of the minorities. Then I demonstrate how populist rhetoric – which is a strategy of political opposition – evolves into concrete constitutional amendments once populist parties are in power. For this I analyse, first, Ms. le Pen constitutional program drafted at the occasion of the 2016 French elections and, second, Mr. Orban constitutional amendments since Fidesz party came in power in 2010. The two cases underline a thorough understanding of the specific constitutional contexts the two populist parties are evolving in – far from a spread assumption that populism does not play by the “constitutional rules”. It is where the paradox of populism lays down: while through their rhetoric they reject any sort of rule of law, one in power, populists still respect constitutional rules to implement reforms which threaten the rule of law. I conclude my study by asking whether or not populism and constitutionalism can be reconciled. My answer is no, the so-called ‘populist constitutionalism’ is an oxymoron simply because values carried on by constitutionalism are incompatible with populists’ agenda.
  • Gaston, Sophie. Far-Right Extremism in a Populist Age / Demos, 2017.
    This paper has been prepared against a backdrop of ‘shifting sands’ across Europe and the United States, with fundamental realignments in national political contexts, a broadly spread hardening of attitudes towards cultural and ethnic diversity, and a sense that the far-right – both through attitudes and expressions of violent extremism and populist political movements – has assumed a visible and influential role of historic proportions. It summarises some of the recent trends and developments in the manifestation and enforcement of far-right extremism in a variety of national contexts in both Europe and the United States.
  • Gaston, Sophie. Mediating Populism / Demos, 2018.
    Through a unique series of anonymous, candid interviews with political journalists, producers and editors , the report peers behind the curtain at Britain’s media organisations, shining light on the daily practices of journalism in the digital age. In a case study focusing on the personal and organisational decisions made in covering the European Referendum in June 2016, it showcases the complex intersection of moral, practical and competitive decisions that built one of the most consequential information environments in British history. While much has been discussed about the media’s role in the ‘populist turn’ in Western democracies, this has largely focused on social media platforms, and the actual experience of journalists in responding to these turbulent political times has previously been little explored.
  • Grabbe, Heather. Populism in the EU: new threats to the open society? / European Policy Centre, 2014.
    Writing about populism in the EU, Heather Grabbe asserts that populist parties are thriving, partially due to deep concerns such as economic pain, disillusionment with politics, scepticism toward the representative value of European democracy and insecurities regarding national identities and the durability of European social contracts. She stresses that the increased political power of these parties could change the balance of power between EU institutions, lead to negative spill-over effects into national politics and endanger the EU infrastructure of rights and rule of law. The author calls on European leaders to limit racism in the public debate; connect national and European politics to increase tolerance and bring more voices into the debates and increase transparency at EU level. Furthermore, instead of forming a grand coalition to protect the status quo, mainstream parties should become more active and reform the EU by making progress on issues such as fundamental rights and services liberalisation, while fuelling public debates about the future of Europe and communicating better through social media.
  • Gros, Daniel. Can the EU survive in an age of populism? / Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2017.
    Despite the formidable threats currently facing the EU, Daniel Gros offers reassurances that its multi-level democracy and open economy will become more attractive again once the populists fail to deliver and weakened checks and balances lead to excesses.
  • Gros, Daniel. Is globalisation really fuelling populism? / Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2016.
    On both sides of the Atlantic, populism on the left and the right is on the rise. Its most visible standard-bearer in the United States is Donald Trump, the Republican Party’s presumptive presidential nominee. In Europe, there are many strands – from Spain’s leftist Podemos party to France’s right-wing National Front – but all share the same opposition to centrist parties and to the establishment in general. What accounts for voters’ growing revolt against the status quo?
  • Leonard, Mark ; Torreblanca, José Ignacio. The Eurosceptic surge and how to respond to it / European Council on Foreign Relations, 2014.
    After years of crisis, opinion polls across Europe forecast sweeping gains for Eurosceptic parties at the EU elections in May 2014. They are especially likely to make gains in three large countries: France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, become a key political force in Greece, Czech Republic and the Netherlands and get quite a push in Denmark, Austria, Lithuania, Hungary and Finland. With a growing transnational power base in an increasingly powerful European Parliament, these parties may be able to slow down further eurozone integration and undermine the legitimacy of the European project. But the biggest impact of a Eurosceptic victory may be on mainstream politics. They may succeed in associating the EU with fears over immigration, and turn politics into a crude and unhelpful battle between “more” and “less” Europe.
  • Merkel, Wolfgang. Past, present and future of democracy / Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (European Commission), 2019.
    The EU’s framework programmes for research and innovation have devoted significant investments towards the study of democracy. This review presents findings from framework programme projects and in general takes stock of European research on the subject matter. It provides a mapping of results, evidence and recommendations, and assesses the needs and pertinent foci for future European research. It aims to build on areas of research where there is already a good deal of knowledge. At the same time, it focuses on those areas where there are gaps in our knowledge about the workings of and present threats to democracy.
  • Michel, Elie. Welfare politics and the radical right. The relevance of welfare politics for the radical right’s success in western Europe / European University Institute, 2017.
    This thesis looks at the success of radical right parties in western Europe through the perspective of welfare politics, by examining parties and voters in a comparative and mixed method perspective. I argue that purely socio-cultural or socio-economic accounts of the radical right success face several theoretical and empirical shortcomings. Focusing on the conflict dimension of welfare politics — who gets what, when and how in terms of social benefits — constitutes a novel approach to explain these parties’ and voters’ political preferences.
  • Missiroli, Antonio. The rise of anti-EU populism: why, and what to do about it / European Policy Centre, 2011.
    This Policy Brief by Antonio Missiroli (BEPA) tracks the growth of anti-EU populism over the last decade, describing how populist leaders have successfully plugged into citizens’ concerns about the future, their fears of economic decline, financial insolvency and rising immigration. They have used this to build political movements that threaten the EU’s legitimacy and even its ability to act, especially as mainstream parties are not countering the populist rhetoric with the necessary determination. The author suggests a number of measures to fight anti-EU populism, including dispelling anti-Europe myths, highlighting inconsistencies in the populist narrative, emphasising EU politicians’ and officials’ political legitimacy, and acknowledging problems for what they are as a precondition for articulating adequate solutions publicly.
  • Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself? Mapping and Responding to a Rising Culture and Politics of Fear in the European Union / Demos, 2016.
    This major new research project from Demos will seek to capture how an emerging culture and politics of fear is gripping the European Union as a whole, and its unique manifestations within member states. Demos will be undertaking extensive pan-European research, as well as conducting specific analysis on the implications for the United Kingdom. We will also be commissioning exclusive new academic research within five other member states to provide a snapshot of the ‘flash-points of fear’ on the ground: Spain, France, Germany, Poland and Sweden. 
  • Pelinka, Anton. Extremisten gegen Europa / Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, 2015.
    Der europäische Einigungsprozess ist ein Produkt der politischen Mitte, die den Weg von der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl zur Union des Vertrages von Lissabon gegen den Widerstand extremistischer Parteien auf der nationalistischen äußersten Rechten und der linkssozialistisch-kommunistischen äußersten Linken durchgesetzt hat. Hinter diesem Widerstand stehen nicht nur taktische Motive, sondern auch unausgesprochene Gemeinsamkeiten latent totalitärer Vorstellungen von Politik. Von der Verhinderung des Europäischen Verteidigungsvertrages 1954 bis zum Scheitern des Verfassungsvertrages 2005 demonstriert die faktische Allianz der Extremismen ihre Fähigkeit, ein Fortschreiten der Einigung Europas zu blockieren. Beide Extremismen gehen von illusionären Vorstellungen aus, die im Widerspruch zur politischen Realität stehen, die aber – populistisch vermittelt – Gefühle gegen Vernunft zu mobilisieren verstehen. Beide Extremismen sind durch ein gemeinsames „Defining Other“ verbunden – die liberale Demokratie, wie sie sich in Europa auch und vor allem in der Europäischen Union manifestiert.
  • Populism in Central Europe 2018 (Final Report). Anti EU-rhetoric versus own national interests? National populism and its reception in Central Europe / Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, 2018. Our research is based on five representative opinion-surveys that were conducted in all partner countries in a comparable set up and which provide a broad insight into the public opinion in Central Europe on EU membership, its advantages and downsides as well as the assessment of national EU politics, the question of a gap between elites and “ordinary” citizens and other related topics. The results of our surveys were lively discussed at public events organised in all capitals of the project partners as well as in Brussels. This report highlights the main results of our surveys, depicts some of the citizens’ views and finally draws conclusions and policy recommendations on how to tackle the challenges ahead and contribute to a constructive European debate based on common values and mutual understanding instead of limited national views that in the end lead to divisiveness and the loss of long-term achievements of the European integration process.
  • Reid, Jim ; Templeman, Luke. Politics, populism and power / Deutsche Bank Research, 2019.
    Many investors think of themselves as apolitical, however, recent market turbulence has reinforced just how much politics can affect business and finance. This issue of Konzept offers incisive opinion on some pressing political issues, including the trade war between China and the US, next year’s US presidential election, European populism, technology regulation, Brexit, and more. 
  • Siewert, Norman. Rechtsextreme Gewalt in Deutschland vor dem Hintergrund der „Flüchtlings- und Migrationskrise“ / Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2019.
    Auf dem Weg in einen neuen Rechtsterrorismus? Die Jahre 2015 und 2016 markieren einen neuen Höhepunkt rechtsextremer Gewalt in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. War das Thema Asyl bereits 2014 das wichtigste rechtsextreme Kampagnenthema, hat sich der sprunghaft angestiegene Zustrom von Migranten im Spätsommer 2015 bis zum Frühjahr 2016 in hohem Maße radikalisierend auf den gesamten Phänomenbereich ausgeübt. Im Zuge dessen kam es zu beträchtlichen rechtsterroristischen Aktivitäten. Klandestine Gruppenzusammenschlüsse wie die „Gruppe Freital“, „Oldschool Society“ oder „Revolution Chemnitz“ nahmen gezielt Migranten, Flüchtlingshelfer und Politiker ins Visier. Zusätzlich stellten kurzentschlossene Einzeltäter wie Frank S., der die Kölner Oberbürgermeisterin Henriette Reker niederstach, die Sicherheitsdienste vor neue Herausforderungen. Das Papier gibt einen Überblick über das aktuelle Gewaltpotential des Rechtsextremismus und beleuchtet darüber hinaus die rechtsterroristische Bedrohungslage vor dem Hintergrund der „Flüchtlings- und Migrationskrise“.
  • Stoyanova, Vladislava. Populism, Exceptionality, and the Right to Family Life of Migrants under the European Convention on Human Rights // European Journal of Legal Studies (2018) nr. 2.
    The recent populist turn in national and international politics poses a threat to the rights of migrants. In this context, the key question that this article addresses is whether and how the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), can be a point of resistance against populism. More specifically, how might the ECtHR respond to the anti-migration dimension of the populist politics when adjudicating cases implicating the rights of migrants (with a focus on the right to family life)? In this article, I acknowledge that the Court, through its adjudicative function, has created a space where the state has to advance reasoned arguments to justify disruptions of family life in pursuit of immigration control objectives. At the same time, however, I also demonstrate that this space does not reflect the usual rigor of scrutiny conducted by the Court in cases that do not concern immigration policies (i.e. the proportionality reasoning with its distinctive subtests is applied with serious aberrations). The Court acts with restraint when called upon to uphold the rights of migrants; it sides with the sovereign states and, therefore, any populist attacks against the Court are unsubstantiated. I would like to also inject a note of caution for the Court itself about how it reasons. More specifically, in its restraint to exercise resistance against the sovereign states’ entitlements in the area of migration, the Court is getting dangerously close to utilizing populist tools. Finally, I explain the ‘procedural turn’ taken by the Court when adjudicating the right to family life of migrants. While I acknowledge that this is a useful tool for the Court to maintain its standing in the sensitive area of migration, I also indicate the dangers that might emerge from its application. In particular, controversial decisions are left to be taken at the national level and the Court will be reluctant to examine them unless the quality of the national decision-making process is suspect.
  • Surel, Yves. The European Union and the challenges of populism / Jacques Delors Institute, 2011.
    The progression of extremist parties in recent elections (for example in Finland in April 2011) relaunched the debate on the rise of populism within the EU, as well as the negative attitudes of national public opinion and political leaders, on solidarity in the Eurozone or migration issues. In this context, the Notre Europe’s Policy Brief written by Yves Surel analyses the populist phenomena in an historical and theoretical perspective and describes how the EU can be the target of populism, as well as the limited responses of the European authorities.
  • Swoboda, Hannes ; Wiersma, Jan Marinus. Democracy, populism and minority rights / European Parliament, 2008.
    Socialists and social democrats are and should be very concerned about growing populism and an increasing lack of respect for minorities. This publication concentrates on recent developments in new Member States. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have in the last two decades gone through a democratic and socio-economic transition which is without precedent. Latent problems related to that process came to the surface after EU accession, culminating in expressions of extreme nationalism, the rise of populist parties and the reappearance of unresolved questions concerning minorities. In this publication, edited and introduced by Hannes Swoboda and Jan Marinus Wiersma, these trends are analysed and discussed in a frank way by well known researchers and prominent MEPs from the new Member States. They give a better insight and provide lessons on how to move our agenda forward in the whole of Europe.
  • Railo, Erkka ; Vares, Vesa. The Many Faces of Populism: The True Finns through the lens of political history and the media / Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 2011.
    The purpose of this publication is to examine the True Finns’ good result in the 2011 parliamentary election from the viewpoint of political communication. On the one hand, it analyses the True Finns’ media publicity prior to the election as regards the coverage of the European Union and the global economic crisis in particular. On the other hand, it reviews how the True Finns’ MP candidates employed blogging in their electoral campaigns and the kind of response they received. These two forms of political communication are linked by the result: the True Finns gained credibility as a representative for many people as well as an agent in political activity. The main argument is that the mainstream media inadvertently mobilised the True Finns’ potential supporters, while the MP candidates of the party themselves managed to mobilise many more through the social media and, in particular, by blogging.
  • Renda, Andrea. Renzi’s defeat is not another victory of populism / Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2016.
    Following the resignation of the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, Andrea Renda cautions in this CEPS Commentary against conflating the Italian situation with other recent waves of populism that have led to Brexit and the election of Donald Trump.
  • State of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Populism – How strong are Europe’s checks and balances?  / Report by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, 2017.
    This is the fourth annual report of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on the state of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Europe. As with previous reports, the five chapters look at the key building blocks of democratic security: efficient, impartial and independent judiciaries; freedom of expression; freedom of assembly and freedom of association; democratic institutions; and inclusive societies. The report’s analysis of Council of Europe member states’ strengths and weaknesses in these areas can be used to assess their resilience to the challenges posed by populism.
  • Wierenga, Louis. Russians, Refugees and Europeans: What shapes the discourse of the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia? / Humanities and social sciences. Latvia, 2017.
    The Conservative Peoples’ Party of Estonia (EKRE) presents a unique case in the study of far-right parties for two reasons. First, the ‘others’ to which they juxtapose Estonians are the Russian-speaking minority, who are white, Christian, and to a large extent, share many of the socially conservative values of the EKRE. Second, there has been a trend for European far-right parties to look towards the Russian Federation for ideological support due to shared socially conservative ideological positions, and an opposition to the EU and NATO. EKRE takes a different stance towards the Russian Federation than many other far-right parties in Europe. Interviews were conducted with members of EKRE, as well as members of other political parties in Estonia, primarily focusing on the post-migrant crisis relationship between EKRE and the Russian-speaking population in Estonia, as well as other core issues related to EKRE. The aim of this article is twofold: first, it serves as an introductory piece, introducing EKRE to the broader literature on populist, radical right parties. Secondly, this article asks the questions “is the presence, or the possibility of the presence of a foreign, racially and religiously different ‘other’ enough to attract a significant portion of a national minority to vote for and become members of a PRR party?” and “is the presence, or the possibility of the presence of a foreign, racially and religiously different ‘other’ enough to entice a PRR party to cooperate with a national minority which was previously their target?” This article argues that EKRE is open to Russian-speakers becoming members within the party, but will not extend their reach to them as Russian speakers. Rather, they would welcome Russian-speakers as party members provided they are Estonian nationalists who adhere to the party constitution and see Estonia as a sovereign nation which they seek to protect.
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